Archive for the ‘Severini’ Category

Natural Born Morals (Section I)

In Di Vincenzo, Moral Philosophy, Severini on March 26, 2013 at 1:04 PM

Evolutionary explanations of morality generally focus on the ability of judging in moral terms. Adaptationist accounts of morality, in particular, attempt to explain the evolution of morality in terms of the selective advantage that judging in moral terms secured for our ancestors (e.g. Ruse 1986; Joyce 2006; Street 2006). For instance, Ruse claims that “because it is biologically advantageous for us to help and co-operate, morality […] has evolved to guide and stiffen our will” (1986, p. 222). Along similar lines, Joyce claims that “the actions that morality prescribes with categorical force are those that constitute or promote, roughly speaking, cooperation” (2000, p. 714). Finally, Street claims that “certain kinds of evaluative judgments […] contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success […] because they forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances and their responses to those circumstances, getting them to act, feel, and believe in ways that turned out to be reproductively advantageous” (2006, p. 127). The most interesting aspect is that these evolutionary explanations interpret morality as a single and distinct trait (judging in moral terms). This view implicitly assumes that there is an inborn device dedicated to moral judgments. In other terms, there is a mental module, supporting our ability of making moral judgments, which has been favoured by selection because of its efficacy in fitness-enhancing behavior. An alternative to this adaptationist account of morality, is the explanation of morality as exaptation (Prinz 2009; Fraser 2010). This point of view stresses the fact that there is no such mechanism dedicated to morality. Then morality could be an exaptation, that is the cooptation of capacities that have evolved for other purposes (Gould & Vrba, 1982). In other terms, traits that have one or no function, are employed for a new and useful one. The point is that an explanation of morality as both adaptation and exaptation is unsatisfactory. As a matter of fact, this kind of appeal to exaptation does not represent a solution, but only a shift of the problem. In this view, in fact, morality as exaptation could be conceived as a “secondary adaptation”. The question is deeper: what does a moral trait effectively consist in? The problem is that a complex ability such as the moral one, cannot be resumed under a single domain-specific trait (making moral judgments). In our view, it seem to be more consistent, both empirically and theoretically, that many abilities – evolved for different purpose(s) – could be subsumed under a socio-cultural “label” of morality that, in this sense, is conceived as part of the more general-domain of evaluative judgment. Then, the moral “domain” could be an heterogeneous domain in which cognitive, emotional, social, physiological items combine into a biological and cultural field. In this way morality encompasses at the same time some “action strategies”, such as decision making (mainly driven by utility), and general capacities of knowledge of the facts related to the external world in the form of beliefs and values (the basics for normativity).

Fabio Di Vincenzo

Eleonora Severini


Fraser, B. (2010), «Adaptation, exaptation, by-products and spandrels in evolutionary explanations of morality», Biological Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 223-227.

Gould, S. J. & E. S. Vrba (1982), Exaptation – a missing term in the science of form. Paleobiology, Vol. 8, pp. 4-15.

Joyce, R. (2006), The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Prinz, J. (2009), «Against moral nativism», in: Stich and His Critics (Bishop M, Murphy D, eds), pp. 167-189.

Ruse, M. and Wilson, E.O. (1986), «Moral Philosophy as Applied Science», Philosophy, Vol. 61, pp. 173-92.

Street S. (2006), «A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value», Philosophical Studies, Vol. 127, pp. 109-166.


Severini, E.: Review of Driscoll, C., “Can Behaviors Be Adaptation?”

In Philosophy of Biology, Review, Severini on March 22, 2013 at 8:01 AM

Although sociobiology (SB) and evolutionary psychology (EP) are not competitor projects, they must be integrated, argues Driscoll: according to her both psychological mechanisms and behaviors represent kinds of adaptation. In order to achieve an integrate theory, she focuses her discussion on an Sterelny & Griffiths’ idea (Sterelny 1992; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999), for whom SB’s attempt to identify evolutionary explanation for discrete units of human behavior is substantially wrong. Since the relation between psychological mechanisms and produced behaviors is one-to-many, each behavioral change (e.g., B1) cannot exist without a relative change in the mechanism that produced it, which then produces other behaviors’ changes (B2, B3…). Therefore, none behavior is supposed to evolve independently of others, thus it cannot be an adaptation. According to Driscoll’s analysis, there are mainly two objections to this reasoning. First of all, this argument relies on a too strong interpretation of Lewontin’s quasi-independence criterion (QIC). On the contrary, there should be at least one way to change T-trait such that the positive contribution to an organism’s fitness is greater than the total negative contribution supplied by any connected trait: in this way a trait can be considered under natural selection. The latter is that merely possession of a mechanism supporting different behaviors does not imply that changes in one behavior make necessary changes in others. Otherwise, an identical mechanism should manage different inputs in order to produce as many different outputs as it is possible. Seems to me that both these objections are unsatisfactory: as a matter of fact, Driscoll’s interpretation of QIC (Brosnan 2009) does not solve the mereology problem about how legitimately identifying behavioral units; the second objection, relying on a strong computational model of human psychology, can be theoretically assumed but not empirically supported.


Brosnan, K. (2009), Quasi-independence, fitness, and advantageousness, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 40, 228–234 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848609000351

Driscoll, C. (2004), Can behaviors be adaptations?, Philosophy of Science, 71, 16–35. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.1086/381410?uid=3738296&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21101593659077

Sterelny, K. (1992), Evolutionary explanations of human behavior, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 70 (2), 156–172. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409212345051

Sterelny, K. & Griffiths, P. (1999), Sex and death, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. http://www.amazon.co.uk/Sex-Death-Introduction-Philosophy-Foundations/dp/0226773043

Morality and exaptation: adaptation is the matter.

In Moral Philosophy, Severini on December 11, 2012 at 2:33 PM

Eleonora Severini

The so-called by-product explanations of morality have been presented as an alternative to adaptationist accounts (Prinz 2009). According to Prinz, since there is no mental mechanism dedicated to the acquisition of moral norms, the fact that we make moral judgments is not an adaptation but an evolutionary accident, i.e. a by-product of capacities evolved for other purposes. According to Fraser (2010) Prinz’s stance is not inconsistent with an adaptationist account of the evolution of morality. Fraser argues that morality may be, rather than an accident, a secondary adaptation, that is an exaptation, consisting in the cooptation for a new purpose of a structure initially served other functions or none (Gould & Vrba, 1982). Thus, Fraser seems to reconcile the lack of a moral machinery with a description of morality as adaptation: that is, capacities evolved for other purpose(s) (e.g., emotional bonds with kin) have been selected for a different one (e.g., promoting cooperation between non-kin). My point is that the trouble lies inside the nature of adaptation, and it is deeper than the mere semantic question that the same trait could be defined both as adaptation or exaptation depending on which function – past or present – we are referring to. The core of exaptation is not the epistemological claim that it is difficult to tell whether a trait is an adaptation or not, but rather the “ontological objection” that most traits are not adaptations (Dupré 2002). In this sense, we cannot legitimately describe morality as adaptation (Fraser 2010). It seems more appropriate to interpret morality as a by-product only in the sense of being a contingent epiphenomenon that other adaptive mechanisms or building features make possible, not inevitable.



Dupré J. (2002), Ontology is the problem, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25-4, pp. 516517. 


Fraser B. (2010), Adaptation, exaptation, by-products and spandrels in evolutionary explanations of morality, Biological Theory, 5-3, pp. 223227.


Gould, S.J. & Vrba, E.S. (1982) Exaptation- A Missing Term in the Science of Form. Paleobiology, 8, 1: 4-15.

Prinz J. (2009), Against moral nativism, in Bishop M., Murphy D. (eds.), Stich and his critics, Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 167– 189.